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Introduction
For risk management purposes, the evaluation of marginal impacts of current or new positions on risk measures and regulatory capital has been recognized as an important point (Garman (1996) , Jorion (1997) ). In practice, this evaluation can be made through explicit estimators of the first order derivatives of some standard risk measures, such as the Value at Risk (VaR) and the Expected Shortfall (ES), with respect to portfolio allocations (Gourieroux, Laurent and Scaillet (2000) , hereafter GLS, and Scaillet (2000)). Knowledge of the sensitivity is helpful in reducing the amount of computational time needed to process large portfolios since it avoids the need to recompute risk measures each time the portfolio composition is slightly modified (Kurth and Tasche (2002) Garman (1997) , Hallerbach (2003) , Tasche (1999) ). These derivatives are also of particular relevance in portfolio selection problem (see Markowitz (1952) for portfolio selection in a mean-variance framework). They help to characterize and evaluate efficient portfolio allocations 2 when VaR and ES are substituted for variance as measure of risk (GLS (2000), Rockafellar and Uryasev (2000) ). In fact, numerical constrained optimization algorithms for computations of optimal allocations usually require consistent estimates of first order derivatives in order to converge properly.
Unfortunately, the results available up to now have fallen short of takling the problem of netting. Clearly, this is an important omission since most financial positions with respect to one or several counterparties are netted in practice.
Generally speaking, when trading partners agree to offset their positions or obligations, we say that they are netting. By doing so, they reduce a large number of positions or obligations to a smaller number of positions or obligations, and it is on this netted position that the two trading partners settle their outstanding obligations.
In the financial community, positions are most of the time netted inside standardised 2 A related topic is dynamic trading strategies under risk limits (Basak and Shapiro (2001) As mentioned previously, the term netting is used to describe the process of offsetting mutual positions or obligations e.g. to offset an obligation owed by bank A to bank B with an obligation owed by bank B to bank A. There are three main techniques for netting:
• The payment or settlement netting is the process of settling all deals between two counterparties on a net cash basis, in the same currency. It can be informal or based on a formal agreement. The credit risk between counterparties remains unchanged and they stay legally obligated to settle the gross amounts of their positions. Payment netting allows for reducing the need for intra-day liquidity or credit in bridging the timing gaps between gross payments and gross receipts.
• The netting by novation means that a single net amount is contractually substituted 3 They are known as the Lamfalussy standards after the chairman of the Committee that wrote the report. 4 Open positions on exchange-traded contracts were stagnant, falling by 1% in the second half of the year 2002. It should be noted, however, that activity in the two types of markets cannot be directly and simply compared owing to inherent differences in the characteristics and uses of the products.
for previous individual gross sums owed between two counterparties, i.e. existing obligations are discharged by replacing them with a new obligation. Thus, netting by novation is a formal agreement that aims to reduce liquidity and counterparty credit risk. This novation process may take place automatically within the trading day, on the exchange of confirmations between the two banks. The claims need to be in the same currency. This process can be repeated an infinite number of times until the cut-off time for a particular settlement date. Although netting by novation is, in essence, a bilateral mechanism, it can be operated on multilateral basis within a larger group of banks.
• The close-out netting is an arrangement to settle all contracted but not due liabilities to and claims on an institution by one single payment, immediately after the occurrence of a default or termination event 5 . Since netting by close-out only operates upon the occurrence of a designated event, it cannot have any impact upon the number of payment messages passing between the counterparties in their normal trading relationship. Equally, it has no impact on liquidity or credit risk. If a termination event occurs, each trade is settled individually on due date unless the counterparties also agree on a supplementary netting by novation.
Payment and close-out nettings are part of the ISDA Master agreement. The use of netting techniques can bring significant benefits for balance-sheet purposes, capital usage, credit risk and operational efficiencies 6 . Indeed, it reduces the number of payment messages that have to be exchanged between counterparties. This lowers transaction costs and communication expenses, as well as the chance of mistakes. Moreover, netting is important because it reduces credit and liquidity risks, and ultimately systemic risk. Taking an offsetting position subject to a netting agreement is thus related to credit risk mitigation.
The tendency of the regulator is to allow wider range of credit risk mitigants in order to avoid the so-called "domino effect" in the financial sector. In the new Basel Capital 5 An early termination date is designated as the result of the occurrence of an event of default or a decline in the credit quality of a party following the occurrence of merger-related events. 6 See also Duffie and Singleton (2003) for impact of netting in credit derivatives asset pricing.
Accord (see the 2001 consultative document), on-balance sheet netting agreements of loans and deposits of banks to or from a counterparty will be permitted under some conditions.
Note that, in 1995, the 1988 Basel Accord was modified to allow banks to reduce the credit exposures ("credit equivalent" in the Basel terminology) of their derivative positions by bilateral netting procedures (see Crouhy et al. (1998) ).
The paper is organised as follows. In Sections 2 and 3 our aim is to extend the sensitivity analysis of VaR and ES to a setting in which netting is allowed, and to propose suitable estimators of the first order derivatives of VaR and ES in that context. In Section 2, we outline the framework and explain the differences arising from netting agreements in Gaussian case is briefly discussed. In particular we compare VaR and its sensitivity in the netted and unnetted cases, and show on a simple stylized example that netting is a valuable credit risk mitigation device. In Section 3 we outline an extension of the approach, which allows for the presence of collateral. In Section 4, we derive estimators of sensitivities so that they can be used in practical risk management and portfolio selection procedures.
These estimators are of a nonparametric nature and easy to implement. In Section 5 we provide an empirical illustration for a typical portfolio of a large bank. Section 6 contains some concluding remarks. Technical appendices gather proofs. Let us now consider an additional single position a Z Z. This leads to a portfolio value at the initial date t 0 equal to:
Main results
Hereafter the random variable D indicates default of the given counterparty at date t 1 , and takes the value 1 (resp. 0) in case of default (resp. no default). More generally, D corresponds to a credit event that causes some losses, and is the starter of a netting agreement.
In the derivation of the portfolio value at date t 1 we need to distinguish three cases: i) the position is not subject to default risk on the counterparty; ii) the position is subject to default risk and cannot be netted in case of counterparty default; iii) the position is subject to default risk and falls under the umbrella of the master agreement signed with the counterparty. Then the values of the global portfolio at t 1 are obtained from the contributions of each component under default and no default after taking into account potential netting 8 .
7 Note that the identification of default to a given single counterparty is not a limitation of our analysis.
The setting is sufficiently large to accommodate the practical situation of portfolios subject to multiple defaults. 8 In case of default it may happen that the asset Z urgently needs to be replaced because of hedging demand. It is then sufficient to substract the replacement value in case of default at date t1, i.e. add the short position −aZ Z(t1)D. Stated results may be easily adapted to handle that case.
In the following, we are interested in risk measures computed on the portfolio value at date t 1 , namely VaR and ES (see Szegö (2002) for a discussion about conditions for proper use of risk measures) defined by:
where α is a small loss probability level, say 1% 9 . The dependence of VaR and ES with respect to the loss probability level and portfolio allocations will be assumed implicit in the notations. Equations (1) and (2) may also be expressed in terms of losses using L = −V :
9 These risk measures may also be computed on portfolio value changes:
Results obtained for V aR and ES can be immediately translated to V aR and ES using the two changes of variable V aR = V aR + V (t0) and ES = ES + V (t0). In particular, this will lead to
Note that our definition of "Expected Shortfall" does not correspond to the most general definition of this coherent measure of risk (see e.g. Acerbi and Tasche 
Nonetheless, under our assumptions, the law of the loss functions will be absolutely continuous with respect to the Lebesgue measure. In this case, we know that ES andẼS coincide.
As already mentioned, it is interesting to compute the contribution of each position to the risk of the whole portfolio and monitor the most risky ones for precautionary reasons.
Since VaR and ES are homogeneous of degree one, we get by Euler Theorem (see Tasche   ( 1999), for instance) :
and the same expression holds with ES sustituted for V aR. The contribution associated with a Z Z to the global risk measured by V aR (resp. ES) is simply the sensitivity of V aR (resp. ES) with respect to a Z multiplied by the allocation a Z , i.e. a Z ∂V aR/∂a Z , resp. a Z ∂ES/∂a Z . Such a quantity is known in the literature (see e.g. Garman (1997)) as incremental or component VaR.
The first order derivative of V aR and ES with respect to a Z can be easily computed by applying the following proposition.
Consider the loss functions
where ε is a positive real number 10 , and (X, Y, Z) is a random vector admitting a continuous conditional density with respect to the Lebesgue measure, conditionally to the event 10 if ε is negative, the results can be applied by simply changing Z into −Z.
A. First derivative of Value at Risk.
B. First derivative of Expected Shortfall.
Remark 1. Note that we can rewrite simply
and
In the aforementioned loss functions we have implicitly assumed zero recovery rates.
This point of view, not necessarily unrealistic, could appear as too conservative in some cases. Similar formulas to the ones presented in Proposition 1 may be obtained with arbitrary fixed or random recovery rates. Unfortunately, these formulas are a lot more complicated. Indeed, with a non zero recovery rate R, the loss function, say L 3 , becomes
When differentiating with respect to ε, the simplification between the terms that are coming from the market value X − εZ and those that are coming from the credit exposure (1 − R)(Y + εZ) + disappears. Fortunately this problem is avoided when dealing with credit exposures only, as we will see below.
Previous computations have been made in an "integrated" credit and market risk environment. Indeed, Var and ES computations have included impact of both market conditions and credit events on the portfolio value. The previous random variables X, Y, Z are usually functions of some market factors (equity indices, interest rates, exchange rates, credit spreads, ...). Let us remark that we do not rely on the assumption of independence between credit events and changes in these underlying market factors when deriving our results. Actually, some standard credit risk models are based on a dependence between credit events and the variations of some underlying market factors such as equity prices ("structural approaches") or spreads.
For credit analysis purposes, it is common to focus on credit risk solely. Practitioners and regulators are then concerned with so-called exposures to default. The exposure is a random variable related to positions with respect to a single counterparty, say i, and corresponds to a specific amount potentially lost due to the default of that counterparty in the future. Lost amounts are often calculated by some calibrated pricing models. Formally, the exposure at t 1 to counterparty i can be written as
in the unnetted case, and
in the netted case.
Let us stress that positions are related to the same single counterparty i. In the first case, Z is outside a netting agreement while, in the second case, it is not. Note further that exposures have nothing to do with default probabilities of the counterparty. The VaR associated with a single exposure is commonly called a potential exposure, and is a pure credit risk measure linked to positions with a single counterparty.
Moreover, to compute provisions to cover multiple credit losses, it is necessary to aggregate exposures and take into account the probability of default of several counterparties.
Losses can be aggregated, for example, inside some portfolios, sections, or perimeters. The total credit loss of a portfolio P at t 1 is then equal to
denoting by D i the default of the i-th counterparty at date t 1 . To study the marginal impact of a particular position Z related to a given counterparty i on the VaR and ES of the portfolio P is approximately equivalent, depending on the status of Z in terms of netting, to calculate the sensitivity to a Z of the VaR and ES of
for some random variable X.
These sensitivities can be calculated using the following result. 
Proposition 2. Consider the loss functions
Remark 2. Note that we can rewrite
Clearly sensitivities of potential exposures as defined in Equations (11) and (12) can be deduced from the previous formulas by forcing D = 1. The above formulas can also be easily modified to incorporate the presence of a non zero (constant or random) recovery rate.
All aforementioned expressions are explicit. In principle they can be computed, at least numerically, if the joint distribution of (X, Y, Z, D) is known. The exposures are clearly functions of some underlying market factors. Thus, as we have said previously, (X, Y, Z) may depend on D. Nonetheless, once the distribution of the underlying random variables (X, Y, Z) is known and independence with respect to the default event is assumed, estimation is much more simple. This will be the case for reduced form credit risk models where default is not predictable and whose law does not depend on the current or past values of market factors. Implicitly, we will do this assumption in our numerical illustration.
For instance, assume the joint law of (X, Y, Z) is Gaussian N (m, Ω). Then it possible to get a closed form expression for ∂ ε V aR j and ∂ ε ES j , j = 1, . . . , 5. Nevertheless, the formulas are tedious to obtain since the positive parts in the losses functions L j require to evaluate some truncated distributions.
The assumption of normality may seem odd to some readers: the exposures are usually sums of more or less nonlinear instruments with respect to market factors, and these factors themselves often exhibit non Gaussian features (fat tails, volatility clustering). Normality can be understood under a standard market risk approach, where exposures are sums of hundreds of net values. Alternatively, when the time horizon is growing, the distributions of exposures tend to be Gaussian. Thus, we could consider market exposures in the long run, i.e. for a time horizon of several years, to justify this type of assumption.
In the remaining of this section, we only study a simple portfolio example
where the vector of exposures E = (E 1 , E 2 ) is Gaussian with mean m = (m 1 , m 2 ) and
This stylized example is used to illustrate the impact of netting on VaR and their sensitivities.
Let us consider the credit losses when there is no netting agreement between E 1 and E 2 :
and when all positions are netted:
The credit VaR themselves do not admit explicit forms (even in this simple case) and need to be computed numerically. However, once they are known, they can be plugged in the explicit form of the sensitivities derived in appendix D. In the first case the two positions cannot be netted while they can in the second case.
VaR are estimated by computing empirical quantiles on 100,000 simulations delivered by an antithetic variate Monte Carlo procedure. The loss probability level α is equal to 1%
(99% VaR) and the default probability p is equal to 20%.
-Please insert Figure 1 approximately here -It can be observed that netting is valuable from a credit risk management point of view. Indeed, VaR are always lower in the netted case 11 . These results show that netting can be thought as sound credit risk mitigation practice and should be encouraged.
Moreover, the range of VaR sensitivities is larger in the netted case. Hence this example also shows that the sensitivities can differ substantially between the two situations, and that netting agreements should be taken into account when computing VaR sensitivities.
In the netted case we may observe that the VaR sensitivity becomes negative for highly negative correlations. The explanation is simple. If E 1 and E 2 are strongly negatively correlated, E 2 is usually very negative when E 1 is very positive. Hence increasing slightly the position in E 2 has a favourable effect on the VaR of the global netted position. On the contrary it is not possible to benefit from the offsetting effect in the unnetted case, and the VaR sensitivity stays positive always.
Extension to collateral agreements
Netting agreements are only one part of the credit mitigation techniques. The possibility to exchange collateral is often used by lots of dealers. It is recognized as a way to reduce significantly the amount of credit exposures, even if it may entail other risks: liquidity risk, legal risk, custody risk and operational risk.
The ISDA credit forms -each referred to as a Credit Support Annex (CSA) -that go with international master agreements are now part of the standard documentation. Most national master agreements also have a specific collateral annex. The CSA includes a schedule of elections to be negociated between the counterparties, including a counterparty threshold, that is the amount of uncollateralized credit exposure the other is willing to accept. In general, the threshold reflects the counterparty credit rating: the higher the rating, the larger the threshold.
The collateral reduces the current exposure of the collateral taker to the collateral giver by the amount of collateral held. Even if the net value of the collateral is varying, we 11 Note that if we increase the mean of E2 in absolute terms, the benefits of netting increase since the probability of taking positive values diminishes.
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will assume for the sake of computational convenience that the collateral process bounds the net exposure from above by some constant threshold M . Thus, the loss functions With obvious notations we provide the results for the most general loss functions only. 
Proposition 3. Consider the loss functions
Note that the formulas are remarkably similar to previous ones. This was not obvious from the start, in particular for L 3 .
Estimation
Since all sensitivities can be evaluated through conditional expectations, they are amenable to estimation by nonparameric techniques such as the well-known kernel method.
14 To be specific, assume the joint distribution of (X, Y, Z, D) is known explicitly, or that we can get at least n random draws (x i , y i , z i , d i ) i=1,...,n from the joint distribution of (X, Y, Z, D). This is the usual situation because most of the risk models are parametric and/or simulation-based. This setting is large enough to host some dependence between "the market factors" (X, Y, Z) and the default event 12 .
Let us consider a consistent estimator V aR 4 of V aR 4 . For instance, it can be deduced from computing an empirical quantile on the simulated losses l 4,i , i = 1, ..., n. Then, an estimate of ∂ ε V aR 4 can be defined by the usual nonparametric kernel regression estimator:
where K : R → R is a kernel (an integrable function whose integral is one), h = h(n) is a smoothing parameter, called the bandwidth (a sequence of positive real numbers which tends to 0 when n tends to the infinity) and K h (u) = K(u/h)/h 13 . Similarly,
Both estimators are easy to implement since they correspond to ratios of straight averages of known functions of the observed data points.
Denote the density of L k by f k , k = 4, 5, and set
Then we prove the following asymptotic normality result in Appendix D.
Proposition 4. Assume for k = 4, 5,
• K is an even kernel function, |t| 3 |K|(t) dt < ∞, lim |t|→∞ |t| 3 K(t) = 0. It is three times continuously differentiable, K and K are integrable and K is bounded.
12 For instance this dependence exists when equity prices and default probabilities are linked.
• E[|Z| p ] < ∞ for every integer p,
is bounded in a neighborhood of V aR k ,
• nh 5 −→ 0 and nh 7/2 −→ ∞,
• f k and the function V aR k → ∂ ε V aR k are two times continuously differentiable,
• f k and µ k are continuous and strictly positive in a neighborhood of V aR k .
Similar kernel estimators of ∂ ε V aR j , j = 1, 2, 3 can be easily inferred. They are asymptotically normal under similar regularity conditions.
As usually these asymptotic normality results can be used to build confidence intervals around estimates. In particular the number n of simulations can be chosen so that these intervals are sufficiently narrow to guarantee statistically precise sensitivity estimates. The previous asymptotic variances σ 2 k can be easily estimated. For instance, to get an estimate of σ 2 5 , we may replace µ 5 (V aR 5 ) bŷ
and f 5 (V aR 5 ) byf
We can also estimate the sensitivity of the expected shortfall by
The strong consistency of the two latter estimators can be deduced easily from the strong uniform consistency of the empirical process (see Van der Vaart (1994) ). Furthermore, their asymptotic normality can be established under some regularity conditions.
However the forms of their asymptotic normal distributions depend on the choice of the estimators V aR k , and are more complicated than in the VaR case.
Clearly, the previous estimation procedures are straighforward to modify to account for the presence of collateral. We only have to replace the indicator functions 1{y i + εz i > 0} by 1{y i + εz i ∈ [0, M ]} as before.
Empirical application
In this empirical section, we wish to illustrate how the estimators of the previous section can be used in practice. We study a real life banking example and analyze the sensitivity w.r.t. an additional short position in a bond (borrowing) with a single AA-counterparty.
The default probability is 2% at one year. We examine a short position to emphasize Table 1 gives the current value of the 35 aggregated positions in Euros. The current value of the additional short position is equal to -1,150,000 Euros.
-Please insert Table 1 approximately hereWe compare the situation where the additional position can be incorporated inside one of the 35 existing netting agreements with the case where it is left outside any netting 14 .
The 35 netted cases are numbered from 1 to 35, and the unnetted case is called case 0.
14 Let us remark that this illustrative example may look a bit fictitious since one cannot usually choose the status of an additional position. We do so because this enlarges the number of studied cases.
The number of simulations of default times is n = 100, 000, and random future position values are computed from internal pricing models. The estimation procedure is based on a Gaussian kernel and a bandwidth selected according to the usual rule of thumb, namely h =σn −1/5 whereσ is the empirical standard deviation of the credit losses. Table 2 gives the one year credit VaR and one year credit ES together with their sensitivity for each case.
-Please insert Table 2 
Concluding remarks
Risk measures answer the need of quantifying the risk of potential losses on a portfolio of assets. This need may arise due to internal concerns (risk-reward tradeoff) or external constraints (prudential rules imposed by regulators). In this paper we have proposed estimation procedures allowing for a sensivity analysis w.r.t. changes in the portfolio allocation. The setting explicitly takes into account the possibility of netting and collateral agreements. The estimation procedures are nonparametric, fast and easy to implement.
They have also been shown to be of practical relevance in real life banking situations, and should help to achieve better credit risk management in the future. A Proof of Proposition 1.
A.1 First derivative of Value at Risk.
We only provide derivation of ∂ ε V aR 3 . The formula for ∂ ε V aR 2 can be obtained from ∂ ε V aR 3 by simply considering a sequence of random variables (Y n ) which tends to zero almost surely and by applying a limit theorem (such as the theorem of dominated convergence). The expression for ∂ ε V aR 1 is a direct consequence of Property 1 in GLS (2000).
We may rewrite the equation defining V aR 3 as:
where
denoting by f U |1 , resp. f U |0 , the density of any random vector U with respects to the Lebesgue measure, conditionally to D = 1, resp. D = 0. To ease reading, set
A simple calculation provides
This yields
Clearly,
Thus, we deduce
We get
and Bayes' rule gives the stated result. 2
A.2 First derivative of Expected Shortfall.
The expression for ∂ ε ES 1 obtains directly from Proposition 1 in Scaillet (2000). Hence we only provide derivation of ∂ ε ES 3 since ∂ ε ES 2 can be deduced from ∂ ε ES 3 .
By direct differentiation, we get
Moreover,
Note that the last term of ∂ εT2 is the opposite of the last term of ∂ εT3 . After summing all terms, we get
Note that we get by (26):
which simplifies with
because of (27). Thus
proving the result. 2 B Proof of Proposition 2.
B.1 First derivative of Value at Risk.
Again we only need to explicit ∂ ε V aR 5 . We may rewrite the equation defining V aR 5 as:
A simple computation yields
Clearly, we have
Thus, we can rewrite
We deduce
and finally
by Bayes' rule. 2
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B.2 First derivative of Expected Shortfall.
We only provide derivation of ∂ ε ES 5 . As previously,
Here,
We get by recalling Equation (30):
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Thus, by applying Bayes' rule, we get
which proves the result. 2
C Proof of Proposition 3.
Since the calculations are very similar to previous ones, we prove the results for L 5 only and we omit unnecessary details.
C.1 First derivative of Value at Risk.
We may rewrite the equation defining V aR 5 as:
Simple computations and some simplifications yield
so the stated result. 2
After some simplifications and invoking Equation (31), we get
and finally the result. 2 D Sensitivity of V aR and ES under the Gaussian assumption.
Let us first recall a useful lemma:
Lemma 5. The law of E 1 conditionally to E 2 = e is Gaussian with mean
and variance
Invoking (13) , the sensitivity of L U 's Value-At-Risk is
where v is the VaR level. First, let us calculate the density of L U . Actually, L U equals 0 with the probability
Otherwise, L U has a density with respects to the Lebesgue measure on R + .
More specifically, consider a measurable real function ψ. Then
where we have set L = E 1 + εE 2 . By applying successively Lemma 5, we get
Moreover, the random vector (L, E 2 ) is Gaussian with mean m = (m 1 + εm 2 , m 2 ) and
Thus, by applying Lemma 5 and the symmetry of the Gaussian distribution, we get
The density of L U at l > 0 is then
31
For convenience, denoteẽ = e − m 2 andṽ = v − m 1 − εm 2 . Let us compute and by denoting φ, resp. Φ, the pdf, resp. cdf of a standard Gaussian random variable. Moreover,
By taking together equations (33), (32), (34) and (35), we find ∂ ε V aR U .
Similar calculations provide ∂ ε V aR N in the netted case. Here, the loss function equals zero with the probability 1−p+pP (E 1 +εE 2 < 0). This function has a density with respect to the Lebesgue measure at every positive point v, and, with the previous notations,
Equations ( 
E Asymptotic normality of V aR sensitivity estimators
Let us consider an i.i.d. sample (e i , l i ) i=1,...,n of a random vector (e, l). The density of l is denoted by f . Letv be a statistic which tends to a constant v and n 1/2 (v − v) = O P (1).
, and denote the expectation of e i conditionally to l i = v by r(v), and its conditional variance by
Lemma 6. Assume
• E[|e| p ] < ∞ for every integer p,
• t → E[e 4 |l = t] is bounded in a neighborhood of v,
• r and f are two times continuously differentiable,
• f and µ are continuous and strictly positive in a neighborhood of v.
Obviously the limiting behavior of ∂ ε V aR k , k = 4, 5 is a direct consequence of the previous lemma. For instance, set e i = z i 1{z i > 0, D i = 1} to get the result for ∂ ε V aR 4 .
Proof of Lemma 6
The estimatorr(v) can be decomposed intô
with
, and
.
By applying Corollary IV.2 in Bosq and Lecoutre (1987), we get
The second term on the right hand side tends to zero (convergence in probability of the usual kernel estimator of the density function). By a three order expansion of K h , we get
where |v * − v| < |v − v| a.e. Clearly, P 13 is zero for n sufficiently large when nh 7/2 → ∞.
Moreover, for every constant η > 0, there exists a constant C > 0 such that
by an integration by parts. Thus, P 11 tends to zero when n → ∞. Similar calculations provide the same result for P 12 . Thus, we deduce
We can handle R 2 (v) similarly. Thus, we get the stated result by combining (38), (39) and (40). 2
